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A DIAGNOSIS, DISSECTION, AND PROGNOSIS
OF MARYLAND'S NEW WIRETAP AND
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE LAW
Richard P. Gilbertt
This article examines the Maryland Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance Act. After comparing the Maryland
act with corresponding federal law dealing with the
interception of oral communications, the author concludes
that the Maryland act guarantees greater protection from
surreptitious eavesdropping and wiretapping than that
afforded by its federal counterpart.

INTRODUCTION
History does not record the first occurrence of eavesdropping, 1
but it may well have "been soon after Eve gave birth to Cain and
there were thus three persons in existence. Whatever its origin, the
odious practice continues today, but man no longer has to rely upon
his ear alone. Modern technology has turned persons, rooms, and
open areas into radio broadcasting stations by the simple placing of
a microphone - or "bug" - therein or by directing a highly
sensitive listening apparatus toward the place where the
conversation is being held. 2

1.

t

A.A., J.D., LL.M., University of Baltimore; Chief Judge Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland.
The author acknowledges with thanks the aid of Patrick Casey Duncan,
Esq., of the Montgomery County Bar and Shelly Mintz, Esq., of the Baltimore
City Bar, both of whom served as judicial clerks to the author during the term of
Court, September 1977.
1. An examination of the etymology of the term "eavesdropper" inevitably leads to
Sir William Blackstone, who, in 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1803)
168, refers to "Eaves-droppers," as
such as listen under walls or windows, or the eaves of a house, to
hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and
mischievous tales, [and] are a common nuisance, and presentable at the
court-leet, or are indictable at the sessions, and punishable by fine and
finding sureties for their good behavior. (footnotes omitted).
2. Developments in electronics and miniaturization allow virtually indetectable
snooping to be carried out via such diverse technological wonders as transistors,
microcircuits, and lasers. Radio transmitters made out of integrated microcircuits can be constructed on a piece of material smaller and thinner than a
postage stamp. The transmitter can be readily concealed in such unobtrusive
places as behind wallpaper or in a playing card. See generally E. LoNG, THE
INTRUDERS 5-20 (1967); Scoular, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Constitutional
Development from Olmstead to Katz, 12 ST. LoUIS U.L.J. 513, 514 (1968). "Nor is
an individual even safe in the shower - microphones have been developed which
segregate man's voice from the sound of running water." [d. at 514 (footnote
omitted). See also Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A
Professor's View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 891, 892-93 (1960).
Out of the pages of science fiction and into the every-day world emerges the
latest in the arsenal of electronic eavesdropping mechanisms - the laser beam.
One available portable laser microphone sends out an invisible infra-red
beam only a quarter of an inch in thickness. The power of a laser beam

184

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 8

The "wiretap" originated over a hundred years ago when man
learned that he could tap into telegraph lines and overhear Morse
Code messages being sent from one point to another.3 Telegraph
taps were used during the Civil War as a means of intercepting
military communications4 and were later a highly remunerative
source of private gain. 5
On March 10, 1876, in Boston, Massachusetts, Alexander
Graham Bell uttered what are now the historical words, "Mr.
Watson, come here. I want yoU."B Those seven words, the first ever
spoken over a telephone, established a series of new industries. One
of them is the manufacture of equipment to mtercept the electronic
impulses that traverse telephone wires - the "wiretap."?

3.

4.
5.

6.
7.

to remain focused over long distances allows it to go for miles from the
point of transmission to a target room. There it strikes a two-inch
mirrored modulator planted in the room by the investigator, which sends
the laser beam back to its original source miles away. Since the
returning beam has been modulated by the sound waves produced by
speech in the room under surveillance, a photo amplifier at the listening
post allows the investigator to transform the returning light into sound.
(footnote omitted).
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 75 (1970). The energy expended in
tramsmitting a light beam, carrying voices many miles, is minimal, and unlike a
radio beam, a laser beam is practically impossible to detect by any means
currently available. Scoular, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Constitutional
Development from Olmstead to Katz, 12 ST. LoUIS U.L.J. 513, 514 (1968). A
diagram and description of this device appeared in "Someone Knows All About
You," ESQUIRE, May, 1966 at 101. "Big Brother" may indeed be listening, if not
watching. G. ORWELL, 1984 (1948).
S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ, & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS 23 (1959). The
prevalence of telegraphic interceptions was such that in 1862 California found it
necessary to enact legislation prohibiting interception of the coded
communications. 1862 Cal. Stats. 288, CAL. GEN. LAws ANN. act 8530 (Deering
1944).
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 172 (1970); S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ, & R.
KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS 23 (1959).
Gamblers made a practice of intercepting the news of racetrack results in
order to get last-minute bets placed before bookmakers could know which
horse had won. Stock-market operators got inside information and
market prices in time for some fast finagling on the exchanges.
Newspapers pirated each other's exclusive stories before publication.
Blackmailers winnowed some remunerative wheat from the chaff of
telephonic confidences.
A. BARTH, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY 113 (1961). See S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ, & R.
KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS 25 (1959). See generally 1862 Cal. Stats. 288,
CAL. GEN. LAws ANN. act 8530 (Deering 1944), which was aimed at eavesdropping by private parties for the purpose of gaining information that could be
turned into profit.
Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., A HISTORY OF ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE IN
THE BELL SYSTEM: THE EARLY YEARS (1875-1925) 11-12 (1975).
By 1895, the government had replaced the individual profiteer as the primary
user of newly developed eavesdropping techniques. The "New York police were
actively using wiretapping in criminal investigations in 1895. A loose arrangement existed between the New York police and the telephone company whereby
the telephone company cooperated with the wiretapping practices of the police
department, [and this despite the fact that] there were [only] 339,500 telephones
in the country . . . . " S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ, & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS 25 (1959) (footnote omitted).
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II. ORIGINS OF THE MARYLAND WIRETAPPING
AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE STATUTE
Prior to the 1971 decision of the Court of Special Appeals in
State v. Siegel, 8 Maryland had two statutes dealing with the
interception of oral communications. Maryland Annotated Code,
article 35, sections 92-999 applied to the interception of wire
communications, telephonic and telegraphic, while Maryland
Annotated Code, article 27, sections 125A-ClO pertained to electronic
devices used in the interception of oral communications.
The provisions of Maryland Annotated Code, article 35, sections
92-99 (interceptions) were discussed in Manger v. State ll by the
Court of Appeals, but were not applied because Manger lacked
"standing to object to the introduction against him of evidence
seized in the raid made under the authority of the search warrant, on
the groun4 that the warrant was based on evidence forbidden to be
introduced by Sec. 105 of the Act, or to be divulged to any person."12
The court bottomed its decision on the fact that neither of the two
tapped phones was listed to Manger and the complainants were not
participants in the overheard conversations. 13
Subsequently, in Robert v. State,14 the Court of Appeals
implicitly sanctioned the validity of the wiretap sections of
Maryland Annotated Code, article 35, sections 92-99. Nevertheless,
the court overturned convictions for sexual offenses because the
police listened via a "headset" to a telephone conversation, and all
the participants to the communication had not consented thereto.
Article 27, sections 125A-C (devices) were not construed until the
Court of Special Appeals decided Pennington v. State,15 although
they have been peripherally addressed in a series of cases. 16

8. 13 Md. App. 444, 285 A.2d 671, a{{'d, 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972).
9. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, §§ 92-99 (1957), repealed and recodified in MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 et. seq. (Supp. 1978).
10. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 125A·D (1957), repealed and recodified in MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 et. seq. (Supp. 1978).
11. 214 Md. 71, 133 A.2d 78 (1957).
12. Id. at 77, 133 A.2d at 81.
13. Manger's situation was comparable to that of persons who, for lack of a
proprietary interest in particular premises, had no standing to complain of a
search and seizure made on those premises. "[O]ne cannot complain of an illegal
search and seizure of premises or property which he neither owns, nor leases, nor
controls, nor lawfully occupies, nor rightfully possesses, or in which he has no
interest." Baum v. State, 163 Md. 153, 157, 161 A. 244, 245 (1932). See also United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
14. 220 Md. 159, 151 A.2d 737 (1959).
15. 19 Md. App. 253, 310 A.2d 817 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974).
16. E.g., Hopkins v. State, 19 Md. App. 414, 426, 311 A.2d 483, 490 (1973) (illegal
electronic interception of conversations between a state witness and the accused,
suppressed by the trial judge, did not taint indictment); State v. Graziano, 17 Md.
App. 276, 301 A.2d 36 (1973) (information furnished by informant was
insufficient to support order for wiretap); State v. Lee, 16 Md. App. 296, 295 A.2d
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Pennington made clear that while it was a misdemeanor to overhear
or record, through the use of electronic devices, any conversation
without the consent of all the parties to that conversation, the
statute did not provide any other sanction, such as exclusion of the
evidence. 17
With the Court of Special Appeals' opinion in State v. Siegel,18 a
third statute, the federal electronic wiretap and eavesdrop provisions
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,19
became an integral part of the criminal law of Maryland. Siegel
pronounced that pursuant to 18 United States Code, section 2516(2),
if the "principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal
prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision thereof, . . . is
authorized by a statute of that State to make application to a State
court judge of competent jurisdiction for an order":3) permitting the
electronic interception of wire or oral communications, then the
judge to whom the application is made may grant the order in
accordance with 18 United States Code, section 2518. Absent a state
statute authorizing such an application by the principal attorney,
the judge could not issue the order.21 Siegel also pointed out that the
several states are at liberty to adopt more restrictive provisions than
those contained in the federal act. The states, however, may not
enact wiretap or electronic interception statutes that are less
restrictive than those of the federal act inasmuch as Congress has
preempted the field, and the federal statutes prevail over repugnant
state statutes. 22
On certiorari, the Maryland Court of Appeals, in State v.
Siegel,23 trod much the same path as that traveled by Judge Charles
E. Orth, Jr., in the Court of Special Appeals, except that the state's
highest court declared flatly that "[t]he statute [18 United States
Code, sections 2510-2520] sets up a strict procedure that must be
followed and we will not abide any deviation, no matter how slight,
from the prescribed path." 24 The Seigel wiretap was therefore

17.
18.
19.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

812 (1972) (court found that the Federal Wiretapping Act was properly
implemented by MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125A, et seq. and art. 35, § 94); Avery v.
State, 15 Md. App. 520, 539, 292 A.2d 720, 742, cert. denied, 266 Md. 733, cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 977 (1972) (electronic interception and video transmission which
was transmitted to the police with the cooperation and consent of the victim of
the crime held valid). Ct. Johnson v. State, 2 Md. App. 300, 234 A.2d 464 (1967)
(police observations made by means of binoculars held proper to show probable
cause for issuance of search warrant).
19 Md. App. at 278, 310 A.2d at 830.
13 Md. App. 444, 285 A.2d 671, aff'd, 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972).
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 212 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976».
Id. at § 2516(2).
Siegel v. State, 13 Md. App. 444,462,285 A.2d 671, 682, aff'd, 266 Md. 256, 292
A.2d 86 (1972). See also United States v. Curreri, 388 F. Supp. 607 (D. Md. 1974).
Id. at 613.
266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972).
Id. at 274, 292 A.2d at 95 (emphasis in original).
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invalid, as the authorization failed to provide for termination of the
tap as required by the federal statute.
Strict statutory compliance was likewise required in Calhoun v.
State,25 where the State was precluded from curing a "defective
present affidavit in support of an application for a court order
authorizing an electronic listening device, by incorporating by
reference into the present affidavit a prior valid affidavit used in
another application."26 The court refused to permit a deviation from
the prescribed path of the statute. 27
In Spease v. State,28 the Court of Special Appeals elected to
follow a line of cases holding that violation of post-intercept orders
would not be grounds to suppress evidence unless the accused could
show prejudice. 29 The Court of Appeals, on certiorari, affirmed,3l and
25. 34 Md. App. 365, 367 A.2d 40 (1977). But see Poore v. State, 39 Md. App. 44, 384
Md. _ , _
A.2d _
(May 19, 1978)
A.2d 103 (1978), cert. denied, _
(conviction upheld despite certain minimal departures from the judicial order
after interception occurred).
26. 34 Md. App. 365, 366, 367 A.2d 40, 40 (1977).
27. Emphasizing the attitude toward strict compliance, the court said that
frequently a police officer, in a reflective mood, will say, "Judge, you
know this . . . [wiretap law] makes my job a lot tougher and more
difficult." What does one respond, except to say:
"Officer, that's precisely what ... [it] is for. Even in our service, you
are not permitted the efficiency permitted a counterpart in a Gestapo or
an NKVD. From day to day, that is your burden; but from decade to
decade and century to century, that is your glory. When you look at your
wife and children at home at night, you yourself would not have it
otherwise. Yes, officer, it makes your job a lot more difficult. It's
supposed to."
Id. at 377, 367 A.2d at 46 (quoting J. MOYLAN, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE
SECURE, AN EXAMINATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1976».
28. 21 Md. App. 269, 319 A.2d 560 (1974), aif'd, 275 Md. 88, 338 A.2d 284 (1975).
29. United States v. Wolk, 466 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1972) (failure timely to serve
formal inventories of wiretap interceptions, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d)
(1976), did not justify suppression of the evidence derived from a wiretap when
the complainants had actual notice of the interception and were not prejudiced);
United States v. Smith, 463 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1972) (failure to serve notice or
inventory of wiretap within the required 90 day period, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d)
(1976), did not justify suppression of evidence); United States v. Ripka, 349 F.
Supp. 539 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aiI'd, 480 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1973) (failure to provide an
inventory or to specify the period of time during which the interception is
authorized did not constitute grounds for suppression); United States v. Iannelli,
339 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aiI'd, 477 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1973) (congressional
intent did not include voiding an interception ab initio because of unauthorized
disclosure after successfully acquiring evidence pursuant to a lawful wiretap
order); United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (where
unlawful interception of some telephone calls pursuant to court order occurs, only
the unlawful interceptions need be suppressed, and evidence obtained by
procedures sanctioned by statute and court order will not be suppressed); United
States v. Lawson, 334 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (filing of inventories eight
days beyond the time permitted for filing did not require that wiretap evidence be
suppressed absent an allegation of prejudice). But see United States v. Eastman,
326 F. Supp. 1038 (M.D. Pa. 1971), aiI'd, 465 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1972) (judicial
failure to serve an inventory vitiated the wiretap and precluded use of evidence
derived therefrom).
.
30. 275 Md. 88, 338 A.2d 284 (1975). The opinion was written by Chief Judge Robert
C. Murphy. Judge John C. Eldridge dissented on the ground that the police failed
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in so doing stated that "[n]othing in our opinion in this case is
intended to depart in any way from our holding in Siegel."31
It was not until thirty-four months later, in Poore v. State,32 that
the question of pre-order compliance vis a vis post-order compliance
reached the Court of Special Appeals~ The Poore court determined
that any variance with pre-intercept orders will not be tolerated, and
any evidence derived from such illegal acts will be suppressed. On
the other hand, substantial compliance with post-intercept orders
will suffice if the defendant has not been prejudiced. 33
Not long after Spease, the Court of Special Appeals, in
Shingleton v. State,34 observed that except for two narrow exceptions, specified in the federal act, and even then subject to rigid
requirements, applications for wiretap or other electronic interceptions of communications must be made in writing. These two
exceptions involve emergency matters relating to national security
or organized crime. 35
In apparent response to Siegel's implicit invalidation of
Maryland's time framework for communication interception 36 on the

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.

to comply with the minimization provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). Id. at 110, 338
A.2d at 296. But see Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978); Poore v. State,
supra note 26.
275 Md. 88, 108 n.3, 338 A.2d 284, 295 n.3.
39 Md. App. 44, 384 A.2d 103 (1978).
Id. at 53, 384 A.2d at 110. See also text at notes 136-39 infra.
39 Md. App. 527, 387 A.2d 1134 (1978).
39 Md. App. at 534-36, 387 A.2d at 1138-39. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1976) provides:
(7) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, any
investigative or law enforcement officer, specially designated by the
Attorney General or by the principal prosecuting attorney of any State
or subdivision thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that State, who
reasonably determines that(a) an emergency situation exists with respect to conspiratorial
activities threatening the national security interest or to
conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime that
requires a wire or oral communication to be intercepted before an
order authorizing such interception can with due diligence be
obtained, and
(b) there are grounds upon which an order could be entered
under this chapter to authorize such interception,
may intercept such wire or oral communication if an application for an
order approving the interception is made in accordance with this section
within forty-eight hours after the interception has occurred, or begins to
occur. In the absence of an order, such interception shall immediately
terminate when the communication sought is obtained or when the
application for the order is denied, whichever is earlier. In the event such
application for approval is denied, or in any other case where the
interception is terminated without an order having been issued, the
contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted shall be treated
as having been obtained in violation of this chapter, and an inventory
shall be served as provided for in subsection (d) of this section on the
person named in the application.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 94(0 (1957). Siegel did not expressly declare the section
to be unconstitutional, but in light of the court's language that "under no
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ground that it was less restrictive than its federal counterpart and
hence illegal, the 1973 Maryland General Assembly passed and sent
to Governor Marvin Mandel, House Bill No. 962.37 That bill sought
to repeal Maryland Annotated Code, article 35, sections 92-99 and
reenact them in such a way as to avoid federal constitutional
pitfalls. With characteristic paternal benevolence, Governor Mandel
vetoed House Bill No. 962,38 however, and in his message to the
Speaker of the House of Delegates 39 noted,
I cannot believe that the Legislature fully realized the scope
of the provisions, or that Congress realized their scope when
enacting the federal law. In any event, I will not be a party
to making such unlicensed intrusions on private communications a matter of State policy. 40

37.

38.
39.
40.

circumstances is [a state] law enforceable if it is less restrictive than the federal
statute... ," 266 Md. at 271, 292 A.2d at 94, it is clear that § 94(0 was
unconstitutional. This is so because the federal act provides that an order
allowing "interception of any wire or oral communication" shall not be "for any
period longer than necessary, nor in any event longer than thirty days." 18
U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976). Extensions of the order, however, may be granted upon
certain specified conditions. [d. The Maryland statute, article 35, § 94(0, limited
the order to a period of not "longer than thirty (30) days," after which it could be
renewed upon application, and subject to the discretion of the court, "for an
additional period not to exceed thirty (30) days." The Maryland statute failed to
embody the "no longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the
authorization" limitation, embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976), upon the police.
Thus, if the interceptors accomplished their mission on the first day of the order,
they could continue to intercept oral or wire communication for such additional
time as the order was viable, so as to "gild the lily."
House Bill No. 962 was introduced as
AN ACT to repeal Sections 125A through 125D of Article 27 of the Annotated
Code of Maryland (1971 Replacement Volume), titled and subtitle
"Crimes and Punishments," [[subtitle]] subheading "Electronic
Devices"; to repeal Section 585 of Article 27 of the Annotated Code of
Maryland (1971 Replacement Volume), title and subtitle "Crimes and
Punishments," [[subtitle]] subheading "Wire Tapping"; and to repeal
Sections 92 through 99 of Article 35 of the Annotated Code of Maryland
(1971 Replacement Volume), title "Evidence," subtitle "Wire Tapping,"
and to enact in lieu thereof new Sections 92 through [[99]] 99A, to be
under the new subtitle "Wire Interception and Interception of Oral
Communications," to define the terms used in the new subtitle, to
prohibit the unauthorized interception of wire and oral communications
and to prohibit their use as evidence, <to authorize the Attorney General
in certain cases and the State's Attorneys to seek judicial authority for
appropriate law enforcement officials to intercept wire or oral
communications which may provide evidence of certain crimes, to set
forth the procedures to be followed for obtaining authorization to
lawfully intercept wire or oral communications, to set forth the
circumstances under which intercepted communications can be disclosed
or used, to require reports concerning intercepted wire and oral
communications and to provide for recovery of civil damages for persons
whose wire or oral communication has been unlawfully intercepted and
to provide for the registration of certain devices by certain persons.
1973 Md. Laws at 1923.
The speaker at that time was the Honorable Thomas Hunter Lowe, presently an
associate judge of the Court of Special Appeals.
1973 Md. Laws at 1925.
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When Senate Bill No. 141 was introduced at the 1973 First
Special Session of the Maryland General Assembly,42 the Code
Revision Commission drafted what became Maryland Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Code Annotated, section 10-403(£) and (g) to
reflect the Siegel holding. The Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee and the House Judiciary Committee regarded the Commission's
attempt to satisfy the requirements of Siegel as no more than a
"band-aid" approach. 43 Maryland Annotated Code, article 35, section
94(£) was added by amendment to Maryland Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Code Annotated, section 10-403 as subsection (£), and in
substantially the same language that Siegel implicitly found
wanting.
Three years after the rejection of the "band-aid" approach to
solving the Siegel problem, and in the interim allowing unchecked
"bleeding" by bench and bar, a "tourniquet" was applied in the form
of a comprehensive "Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance" law,
which was enacted and codified as Maryland Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Code Annotated, sections 10-401 through 10-412.44 To
41. Enacted by special session as Law of August 22, 1973, ch. 2, 1973 Md. Laws Spec.
Sess.4.
42. The first special session was held as an "Extraordinary Session of the General
Assembly of Maryland," on call by Governor Mandel, beginning July 30, 1973
and ending August 23, 1973. 1973 Md. ,Laws Spec. Sess. 3. A second special
session was called by the Governor and met in Annapolis on November 9, 1973.
It adjourned on November 12, 1973. That session dealt solely with the "energy
crisis." 1973 Md. Laws Spec. Sess. (II) 5.
43. See Revisor's Note to MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-403 as adopted at
the 1973 first special session as Law of August 22, 1973, ch. 2, 1973 Md. Laws
Spec. Sess. 4.
.
44. Law of May 26, 1977, ch. 692, § 3,1977 Md. Laws 2798, 2805. The avowed purpose
of the act was stated as follows:
AN ACT concerning
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance
FOR the purpose of repealing existing provisions of law relating to
wiretapping and electronic surveillance and enacting new provisions
relating to the same matters; defining various terms; prohibiting, with
certain exceptions, the interception and disclosure of oral and wire
communications and prescribing a criminal penalty; prohibiting, with
certain exceptions, the manufacture, possession and sale of devices for
surreptitiously intercepting oral and wire communications, and
providing for the forfeiture of such devices; prohibiting, in certain
circumstances, the use of intercepted communications in various
proceedings; providing for the interception, under certain circumstances
and with prior judicial authorization, of oral and wire communications
by law-enforcement personnel; providing for the protection, disclosure,
and suppression of such communications; requiring certain reports
relating to the interception of such communications; creating certain
civil liabilities and criminal offenses; requiring law-enforcement
agencies to register devices for the interception of oral and wire
communications; and generally relating to the interception of oral and
wire communications.
BY repealing
Article 27 - Crimes and Punishments
Section 125A through 125D and the subheading "Electronic Devices"
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the date of this writing, no reported opinion of the Court of Appeals
or the Court of Special Appeals has directly construed the current
Maryland act.
Having mapped out the historical background for Maryland's
current wiretap and electronic surveillance law, we shall now tread
our way through that labyrinthine legislation.
III. DIAGNOSIS, DISSECTION, AND PROGNOSTICATION
An examination of the Maryland act regulating electronic
interception of oral or wire communications discloses many
similarities to the federal statute. Indeed, it is unmistakable that the
federal law served as the guiding light for the Maryland act. 45 Where

and 585
Annotated Code of Maryland
(1976 Replacement Volume and 1976 Supplement)
BY repealing
Article - Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Section 10-401 through 10-408
Annotated Code of Maryland
(1974 Volume and 1976 Supplement)
BY adding to
Article - Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Section 10-401 through 10-412
Annotated Code of Maryland
(1974 Volume and 1976 Supplement)
Senate Bill No. 175, enacted as Law of May 26, 1977, ch. 692, 1977 Md. Laws
2798, was introduced by the chairman of the committee on constitutional and
public law, Senator Edward T. Conroy from Prince George's County, Maryland.
45. The federal act is an excellent model having withstood constitutional attack at
home, Siegel v. State, supra (on the basis of the fourth amendment), and abroad,
United States v. Feldman, 535 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940
(1976) (fourth amendment); United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 837 (1976) (fourth amendment);
United States v. Doolittle, 507 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 518 F.2d 500 (5th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 1008 (1975), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905 (1977), (first,
fourth, fifth and sixth amendments); United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975) (first, fourth and fifth amendments);
United States v. Martinez, 498 F.2d 464 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056
(1974) (first, fourth and fifth amendments); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974) (fourth amendment); United States
v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973) (fourth
amendment); United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.s. 918 (1974) (fourth amendment); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Lewis v. United States, 417 U.S. 918 (1974), reh.
denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (first, fourth, fifth and sixth amendments); United
States v. Carubia, 377 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (fourth amendment); United
States v. Curreri, 363 F. Supp. 430 (D. Md. 1973), supplemented, 368 F. Supp. 757
(D. Md. 1973) (fourth amendment); United States v. Best, 363 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.
Ga. 1973) (first, fourth and fifth amendments); United States v. $chebetgen, 353
F. Supp. 932 (E.D. Mich. 1973); United States v. Kohne, 347 F. $upp. 1178 (W.D.
Pa. 1972); United States v. Cantor, 328 F. SuPp. 561 (E.D. Pa.; 1971), aff'd, 470
F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1972) (fourth amendment); United States v. Escandar, 319 F.
Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (first, fourth and fifth amendments); Dudley v. State,
228 Ga. 551, 186 S.E.2d 875 (1972) (first, fourth and fifth amendments).
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the state legislation is identical to that of the Congress or relatively
minor stylistic changes have been made so as to narrow the effect of
the law to the geographical confines of Maryland, this discussion
shall do no more than note that fact and then proceed to what the
author perceives to be significant substantive departures from the
federal act.

Section 10-401: Definitions
Subsections (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (10) are, except for minor
stylistic modifications, and the narrowing of their scope to
Maryland, the same as their federal models. 46
Subsection (2) of the federal act defines an oral communication
as one "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation . . . . "47 Maryland's section 10-401(2) is
considerably more inclusive; it defmes "oral communication" to
mean "any conversation or words spoken to or by any person in
private conversation . . . ." While there have not, as yet, been any
appellate court decisions interpreting section 10-401(2), it is
relatively safe to speculate that inasmuch as the Maryland
definition includes a broader class of communications than that
employed by the Congress, it will pass constitutional muster.
Subsection (8) of section 10-401 defmes the phrase "Judge of
competent jurisdiction" as "a judge of a circuit court or the Supreme
Bench of Baltimore City," which may be translated to mean a trial
judge of the circuit court, the second level of the Maryland four-tier
judicial system. 4B Maryland District Court judges and the judges of
the appellate courts are without jurisdiction to authorize electronic
interceptions.
The Maryland act has no provision corresponding to subsection
(3) of section 2510. The reason for the absence is that the federal act
defines "State" in subsection (3). Inasmuch as the Maryland statute
is confined to the State of Maryland and does not involve any extraterritorial enforcement or use.s, the drafters of the Maryland law
properly deemed it unnecessary to include a definition of what is
meant by the noun, "State."
Subsection (9) of section 10-401 of the Maryland statute narrows
the definition of "communications common carrier" as that term is

46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(1), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (11) (1976) respectively.
47. ld. § 2510(2) (1976).
48. The Maryland judicial system consists of the Court of Appeals, the highest court
of the State, the Court of Special Appeals, an intermediate court of appeal, the
circuit courts, the highest common law and equity courts of record exercising
original jurisdiction within the State, and the district court, a court of record with
limited jurisdiction. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. COPE ANN. §§ 1-301, 1-401,
1-501, and 1-601 (1973).
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defined in section 2510(10) of the federal act. The federal statute uses
the definition of "common carrier" found in 47 United States Code,
section 153(h), while Maryland limits the definition to include only
"telegraph company," "telephone company," and "radio common
carrier" as defmed in Maryland Annotated Code article 78, sections
2(x), 2(z), and 2(ii), respectively.

Section 10-402: Interception of [Oral or Wire] Communications
Generally
Both section 10-402 of the state law and section 2511 of 18
ynited States Code proscribe the willful endeavor to intercept or to
procure any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept a wire
or oral communication. Furthermore, each imposes a penalty of
imprisonment of "not more than five years" or a "fine of not more
than $10,000."49 Both the federal and state statutes apparently
prohibit the use of the interception for any purpose by any person
who knows or has reason to know that the interception was obtained
in violation of the respective statutory enactments. 50
Both acts, however, exempt from their purview switchboard
operators or employees or agents of any communication common
carrier who intercept wire communications in the course of their
normal duties incident to the service provided by the common carrier
or for the protection of the "rights or property of the carrier."51
The state statute carves out a further exception for which there
is no federal counterpart. Subsection (c)(ii) of section 10-402 provides
that it is permissible for the carrier's employee to provide
information, facilities, or technical assistance to an investigative or
law enforcement officer who is authorized by the statute, either
directly or by order of a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction, to
intercept a wire or oral communication. Subsection (c)(ii) appears to
permit local police to gain technical aid from the communication
common carrier's personnel. Whether that feature of the state act
will be construed as being less restrictive than the federal law
remains to be determined, but on the surface the subsection does no
more than recognize that which is implicit in the federal act.
Certainly, federal agents must of necessity, from time to time, obtain
information from a common carrier and its employees, as well as
occasionally utilize the carrier's facilities and rely on the technical
knowledge of the carrier's personnel.

49. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1976); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(b) (Supp.
1977).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(I)(d) (1976); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § lo-402(a)(3)
(Supp. 1977).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a) (1976); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1O-402(c)(I)(i)
(Supp. 1977).

194

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 8

One significant feature that distinguishes the federal law from
that of Maryland ls that under the former a party to an oral or wire
communication may give prior consent to a law-enforcement official
to intercept or record the communication without the consent or
knowledge of the other party or parties to the communication. 52 In
such a case, no judicially authorized interception order is required.
The federal statute imposes no limitation on that procedure with
respect to the nature of the crime. 53 Furthermore, subsection (d) of
section 2511 allows one of the parties to a conversation to record it,
or to permit another, not a police or investigative officer, to do so
without the knowledge or consent of the other party or parties to the
communication, provided the interception is not for the purpose of
"committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of'
constitutional, federal or state law. While the Maryland act does
authorize a law-enforcement officer to intercept oral or wire
communication on the strength of the "prior consent" of one of the
parties to the communication, it limits its use to the crimes of
"murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or
dealing in controlled dangerous substances."54 Of singular
importance, oral or wire communications concerning crimes other
than those specified may not be intercepted unless all the parties to
the communication have given their prior consent, and only then if
the interception is not to be used for the purpose of committing a
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or
Maryland or for any other injurious act. 55 Of course, if the
interceptor is armed with a judicially issued interception order, made
in accordance with the provisions of the state act, a subject
discussed in greater detail below, the prohibition established by
subsection (c)(2) does not apply. 56

52. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1976).
53.Id.
54. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1O-402(c)(2) (Supp. 1977). The General
Assembly, by enacting House Bill 475 as Law of May 2, 1978, ch. 339, 1978 Md.
Laws 1424, effective July 1,1978, added "any felony punishable under the 'Arson
and Burning' subheading of Article 27" to the offenses for which the interception
of wire or oral communication is permissible under section 1O-402(c)(2). By failing
to enact House Bill 701, the 1978 legislature refused also to permit the
interception of wire or oral communication evidence of "receiving stolen goods"
and "larceny." The Court of Special Appeals, in Reed v. State, 35 Md. App. 472,
372 A.2d 243 (1977), upheld the recordation of tapes of telephone conversations
made by Reed to his rape victim. The offense in that case occurred prior to the
effective date of the current Maryland statute so that the federal act was
applicable thereto. The court noted that while MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125A
proscribed the ex parte recording of communications the statute did not prohibit
the admission of such recording into evidence, but merely imposed a criminal
sanction therefor if the state's attorney for Montgomery County elected to pursue
that avenue, a highly dubious possibility.
55. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(c)(3) (Supp. 1977).
56. See Poore v. State, 39 Md. App. 44, 384 A.2d 103 (1978); Pennington v. State, 19
Md. App. 253, 310 A.2d 817 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974).
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Section 10-403: Manufacture, Possession or Sale of Intercepting
Device
This section makes unlawful the manufacturing, assembling,
possessing, or selling of "any electronic, mechanical, or other
device" if the manufacturer, assembler, possessor, or seller knows or
should know that the device is primarily useful in the surreptitious
interception of either wire or oral communications. Anyone
convicted of violating this provision of the statute is subject to the
same penalty as that prescribed for illegal eavesdropping or
wiretapping of oral or mechanical communication. 57
The application of section 10-403 is markedly different in many
respects from that ofl8 United States Code, section 2512. Expressly
deleted from the state statute are law-enforcement officers of the
federal government,58 and state law-enforcement officers who
manufacture, assemble, possess, or sell such a device under the
specific authorization of the chief administrator of that particular
law-enforcement agency of which the assembler or manufacturer or
possessor is an employee. 59 Any sale of the device by a federal agent
or a state employee "may only be for the purpose of disposing of
obsolete or surplus devices."60 A similar restriction on the sale of the
interception device by law-enforcement officers is not contained in
the federal act. It should be noted that the state wiretapping and
electronic surveillance law makes no attempt to establish a
procedure for the determining of obsolescence or surplusage, nor
does it designate the person or persons who are required to make
that vital decision. It can be inferred from the general tenor of
section 10-403 that the "sale," when made on the grounds of
obsolescence or surplusage will find a very limited market in light of
the prohibition against possession of interception devices
enumerated in section 10-403(a). Furthermore, expressly exempted
from the breadth of the state act are those persons 61 who are under
contract with the federal government, or the government of any
state or political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia to
manufacture, assemble, possess, or sell electronic or other
interception devices for the use and benefit of the government so

57. The penalty for the unlawful manufacture, assembly, possession, or sale of
intercepting device is a fine of not more than $10,000 or-five years imprisonment,
or both. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § ID-403(a) (Supp. 1977). See 18
U.S.C. § 2512(1) (1976).
58. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § ID-403(b)(3) (Supp. 1977).
59. ld. § ID-403(b)(4).
60. ld. § 10-403(b)(3)(4).
61. ld. § ID-401(5) defines "Person" as "any employee or agent of this State or a
political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint
stock company, trust, or corporation. . . . "
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contracting with them. 62 Both the federal act, 18 United States Code,
section 2512(2)(a) and the state statute, Maryland Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Code Annotated, section lo-403(b)(I) exclude a
communications common carrier, and a person under a contract
with a carrier, from the interdiction of the respective statutes.

Section 10-404: Forfeiture of Device
The state law commands that any electronic or other device
used, possessed, assembled, manufactured, or sold in violation of
section 10-402 or section 10-403 be seized and forfeited to the
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services of Maryland.
Section 2513 of the federal statute authorizes forfeiture of the device
to the United States, but directs that the forfeiture shall be governed
by "the customs laws contained in title 19 of the United States
Code."63

Section 10-405: Admissibility of Evidence
This section forbids the receipt into evidence of any information
before "any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency,
regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of this
State, or a political subdivision [of Maryland] if the disclosure of
that information would be in violation" of the act. 64
The Court of Appeals, in Carter v. State,65 said that evidence
obtained as the result of an illegal search or seizure of property must
not only be excluded at trial, but also "cannot be used, because of its
taint, as a valid basis to justify the existence of probable cause in a
subsequent search and seizure warrant."66 Judge O'Donnell, writing
for a unanimous court, then said,
Thus, if any conversation of Carter or any conversation
overheard upon his premises - whether he was present and
participating in it or not - was subjected to a "search and
seizure" by the use of any wire tap or eavesdropping device,
in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. . .
any information garnered as "fruits" of such primary

62. Id. § lo-403(b)(2). Apparently it is unlawful for any manufacturer, assembler,
possessor or seller of electronic or other types of interception devices to contract
with the local governments of United States possessions such as Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the Virgin Islands, et alia. Seemingly, if one of those governments
wanted to contract with a Maryland manufacturer, assembler, possessor or seller
of interception devices, it would have to do so through the federal government.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2513 (1976).
64. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-405 (Supp. 1977). The exclusion of
illegally seized evidence has traditionally served as the enforcement mechanism
of the fourth amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
65. 274 Md. 411, 337 A.2d 415 (1975).
66. Id. at 438, 337 A.2d at 431.
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illegality and "come upon" by the "exploitation" of that
illegality cannot, . . . be used as derivative evidence for an
application for a search and seizure warrant; to hold
otherwise would permit the prosecution to use knowledge
acquired in violation of the Fourth Amendment and "gained
by its own wrong."67
Prior to the Carter case, the Court of Special Appeals reached a
similar conclusion in Washburn v. State. 68 Washburn contended in
the appellate court that he should have been afforded a hearing
before trial at which time he might have been able to produce
evidence demonstrating that the police ascertained the identity of an
informant as the direct result of an illegal wiretap. Washburn
asserted that if the wiretap was illegal, then the knowledge the
police obtained as to the informant's identity was "the product of
illegally intercepted evidence."69
Although the Court of Special Appeals found that the "original
taint" was "so diluted" by attenuation "as to make it virtually nonexistent,"70 the court discussed the prosecution's burden in
overcoming the taint of illegally seized evidence:
Once it is shown that the identity of a State witness was
discovered through an illegal wiretap, that witness's
information - whether by way of testimony at trial or as
support for a finding of probable cause - must be excluded
unless the State can establish: (1) that the identity of the
witness originated from an independent source, or (2) that
the taint, resulting from the witness's identity being
discovered as a result of an originally unlawful wiretap, has
become so attenuated that there is no rational basis to
exclude the evidence obtained from the witness . . . . We
decline to adopt a rule which would, ipso facto, exclude all
testimony of a witness identified as a consequence of an
illegal search. 71

Carter and Washburn were decided under section 2515 of the
federal statute, but they would clearly be applicable to section
10-405 of the Maryland act because the wording of the two statutory
sections upon which the cases are grounded is identical except for
minor stylistic differences.

67. Id. at 438-39, 337 A.2d at 431 (citations omitted).
68. 19 Md. App. 187, 310 A.2d 176 (1973).
69. Id. at 201, 310 A.2d at 184.
70. Id. at 202, 310 A.2d at 185.
71. Id. at 201-02, 310 A.2d at 184-85. See also Carter v. State, 274 Md. 411, 437-38,
337 A.2d 415, 430-31. (citations and footnote omitted).
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Section 10-406: Attorney General or State's Attorney May Apply
for Order Authorizing Interceptions
This section provides that,

the Attorney General or any State's attorney may apply
to a judge of competent jurisdiction, and the judge, in
accordance with the provisions of . . . this article, may
grant an order authorizing the interception of wire or oral
communications by investigative or law enforcement officers when the interception may provide or has provided
evidence of the commission of the offense of murder,
kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or
dealing in controlled, dahgerous substances, or any
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses. No
application or order shall be required if the interception is
lawful under the provisions of § lQ-402(c) of this subtitle. 72
The state act substantially modifies 18 U.S.C. section 2516. The
Maryland law not only prohibits the delegation of authority to apply
for wiretap authorizations by the Attorney General to "any
Assistant Attorney General specifically designated by the Attorney
General," as permitted under the federal act,73 but also the offenses
in which the interception may be used are severely curtailed in
number to fourteen, counting conspiracy to commit any of the
specified seven offenses set out in section 10-406, above, as
compared with the plethora of crimes in which interception has
been authorized by the Congress. 74

72. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-406 (Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1976).
74. The Attorney General or his specifically designated Assistant Attorney General
may authorize an application to a federal judge of a court of competent
jurisdiction for an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral
communications in the following instances, "when such interception may
provide or has provided evidence of:
(a) any offense punishable by death or by imprisonment for more
than one year under sections 2274 through 2277 of title 42 of the United
States Code (relating to the enforcement of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954), or under the following chapters of this title: chapter 37 (relating to
espionage), chapter 105 (relating to sabotage), chapter 115 (relating to
treason), or chapter 102 (relating to riots);
(b) a violation of section 186 or section 50l(c) of title 29, United
States Code (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor
organizations), or any offense which involves murder, kidnapping,
robbery, or extortion, and which is punishable under this title;
(c) any offense which is punishable under the following sections of
this title: section 201 (bribery of public officials and witnesses), section
224 (bribery in sporting contests), subsection (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of
section 844 (unlawful use of explosives), section 1084 (transmission of
wagering information), section 1503 (influencing or injuring an officer,
juror, or witness generally), section 1510 (obstruction of criminal
investigations), section 1511 (obstruction of State or local law
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The Supreme Court, in United States v. Giordano,75 interpreted
the phrase in section 2516(1), "The Attorney General, or any
Assistant Attorney General specifically designated by the Attorney
General, may authorize an application to a Federal judge ..." to
mean precisely what the words state. Consequently, the approval of
an application for an interception order by the "Executive Assistant
to the Attorney General" did not satisfy the statutory requirement
irrespective of the Executive Assistant's "knowledge of the Attorney
General's actions on previous cases."76 The result of the Court's
holding in Giordano was that a wiretap order of the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland was invalidated and the
evidence derived therefrom was suppressed.
The Court of Special Appeals, in Poore v. State,77 interpreted
section 2516(2)78 as follows:
Section 2516(2) speaks of "[t]he principal prosecuting
attorney of any State, or the principal prosecuting attorney
of any political subdivision . . . . " The language of that
section does not confer upon the principal prosecuting
attorney any power to delegate to an assistant the authority
to apply for an electronic interception. The Congress would

75.
76.
77.
78.

enforcement), section 1751 (Presidential assassinations, kidnapping, and
assault), section 1951 (interference with commerce by threats or
violence), section 1952 (interstate and foreign travel or transportation in
aid of racketeering enterprises), section 1954 (offer, acceptance, or
solicitation to influence operations of employee benefit plan), section
1955 (prohibition of business enterprises of gambling), section 659 (theft
from interstate shipment), section 664 (embezzlement from pension and
welfare funds), sections 2314 and 2315 (interstate transportation of
stolen property), section 1963 (violations with respect to racketeer
influenced and corrupt organizations) or section 351 (violations with
respect to congressional assassination, kidnapping, and assault);
(d) any offense involving counterfeiting punishable under section
471, 472, or 473 of this title;
(e) any offense involving bankruptcy fraud or the manufacture,
importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise
dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana, or other dangerous drugs,
punishable under any law of the United States;
(0 any offense including extortionate credit transactions under
sections 892, 893, or 894 of this title; or
(g) any conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1976).
416 U.S. 505 (1974).
Id. at 510.
39 Md. App. 44, 384 A.2d 103 (1978).
18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal
prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision thereof, if such attorney
is authorized by a statute of that State to make application to a State
court judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing or
approving the interception of wire or oral communications, may apply to
such judge for, and such judge may grant in conformity with section
2518 of this chapter and with the applicable State statute....
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not have so carefully limited the power of the Attorney
General of the United States to delegate to a specifically
designated assistant the authority to seek orders to intercept
oral or telephonic communications and at the same time
bestowed upon the principal prosecutor of any State, city or
county in the nation an unbridled license to clothe any or all
of his or her assistants with permission to seek such orders.
It is inconceivable that the country's highest legal officer
would be so shackled while the principal prosecutor of the
least populated county in the United States was free to
permit any designee to apply for an interception order. We
think the intent of the Congress to be that the authority
devolved upon the principal prosecutor of the State or of the
political subdivision, is personal to him, and may not be
delegated. "[T]he authority to apply for court orders is to be
narrowly confined ... to those responsive to the political
process, a category to which the . . . [Assistant State's
Attorney] obviously does not belong . . . . "
We are supported in our holding by an examination of
former Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 10-403 (1974) and
former Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 125A-D, which were in effect
at all times during the surveillance, indictment, and trial of
this case, as well as the current Md. Cts. & Jud. Code Ann.
§ 10-406 (Supp. 1977). All speak of "The Attorney General or
a state's attorney" as being the person to apply for "an order
authorizing the interception of wire or oral
communications . . . . " Id. Nowhere in any of the former
statutes or the present statute is there so much as a hint that
the Attorney General or the State's Attorney may delegate
the authority to apply for interception orders. The statutes,
both past and present, empower only the Attorney General
or the State's Attorney to seek such orders. It is a power
entrusted solely to them as they are the ones answerable
through the political process to the electorate. 79
The court has thus passed upon section 10-406 of the current
state electronic surveillance and wiretap law, and the message is
crystal clear: the authority to apply for an order to intercept by
electronic device or otherwise is personal, by virtue of the office he or
she holds, to the Attorney General of the state and to the State's
Attorney of the City of Baltimore or one of the twenty-three counties.
It may not be delegated by the Attorney General or by any State's
Attorney to another person irrespective of any specific designation. 80

79. 39 Md. App. 44, 57-58, 384 A.2d 103, 111-12. (footnote and citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
80. "The Attorney General of Maryland, the City of Baltimore State's Attorney, and
all county State's Attorneys are answerable directly to the electorate. An
assistant to any of them is not so answerable." Id. at 57 n.lO, 384 A.2d at 112
n.lO.

1979]

201

Electronic Surveillance

Section 10-407: Lawful Disclosure
Communication

or

Use

of Contents

of

This section of the Maryland act is almost identical to 18 United
States Code, section 2517. Both statutes permit a police officer to
relay information to another law-enforcement officer "to the extent
that such disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the
official duties of the officer making or receiving the disclosure."81
Any law-enforcement officer who has obtained knowledge of the
contents of a wire or oral communication or evidence derived
therefrom, may use it to the extent it is appropriate to the proper
performance of his duty, but only if the knowledge has been acquired
"by any means authorized" by statute. 82 Hence, if officer "A" has
illegally intercepted an oral or wire communication, he may not pass
it on to officer "B," for "B's" use in further investigation,
apprehension or prosecution. The taint attached to officer "A's"
acquisition of the content of the communication is not eradicated by
being once, or twice removed from the source of that taint.
Nevertheless, if either officer "A" or "B" were able to demonstrate
that he, separate and apart from the primary taint, had discovered
evidence from an independent source or that the original taint "has
become so attenuated that there is no rational basis to exclude the
evidence,"83 then the evidence would be admissible. In this
connection it is well to consider the advice of one legal scholar:
The critical question when dealing with attenuation should
be whether the admissibility of the challenged evidence will
create an incentive for illicit police activity in the future. The
attenuation doctrine can play an important role in the
application of a derivitive evidence rule. Experienced trial
judges must carefully scrutinize sophisticated arguments
which attempt to make the illegal link in the chain appear
weak when, in fact, the entire chain depends on and
encourages illicit police activity.84
A law-enforcement officer may disclose the information he has
lawfully obtained as a result of an authorized interception in "any
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1) (1976); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-407(a) (Supp.
1977).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(2) (1976); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-407(b) (Supp.
1977).
83. Washburn v. State, 19 Md. App. 187,201-02,310 A2d 176, 184 (1973). See also
United States v. Marder, 474 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1973); Carter v. State, 274 Md.
411, 437-38, 337 A2d 415, 430-31 (1975); People v. Mendez, 28 N.Y.2d 94, 268
N.E.2d 778, 320 N.Y.S.2d 39, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 911 (1971); People v.
Scharfstein, 52 Misc. 2d 976, 277 N.Y.S.2d 516 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Annot., 50
AL.R.2d 531, 569 (1956); Annot., 143 AL.R. 135 (1943).
84. R. Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF.
L. REV. 579, 646 (1968); See also Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree - A Plea
for Relevant Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1136 (1967).
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proceeding held under the authority of the United States or of
[Maryland] or any political subdivision thereof."85 The original
federal act allowed the disclosure in "any criminal proceeding"
only,86 but the act was amended so as to delete the requirement that
the testimony or evidence be given only in "criminal" proceedings. 87
If the Maryland and federal statutes mean what they seem to say,
there appears to be no barrier to the disclosure. The intercepting
officer apparently may testify as to the content of a wire or oral
communication at any civil proceeding authorized by state or federal
law. 88
Interesting hypothetical situations that cast some doubt upon
the wisdom of the use of the term "any proceeding," vis a vis, "any
criminal proceeding," provide food for thought. Maryland Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Code Annotated section lO-408(g) mandates that "[i]mmediately upon the expiration of the period of the
order," the tapes of the contents of wire or oral communications that
have been intercepted shall be "made available" to the issuing judge
and "sealed under his directions." Custody of the tapes "shall be
wherever the judge orders" provided that the terms of the order have
been fully met and that there is no defect in the application,
including probable cause. Assume, for example, that the State's
Attorney finds no basis to prosecute, but that the tapes reveal that
the suspect's wife is engaged in an affair with a lover. The suspecthusband independently discovers his wife's infidelity and sues for a
divorce. While the tapes of the communications were sealed and not
usable in the divorce case, the officer's lips are not so sealed. The
plaintiff learns of the interception as a result of the notice
requirement of section lO-408(g)(4). The divorce case is unquestionably a "proceeding held under the authority of. . . this State. . . ."89
May the officer who has conducted the interception testify in the
divorce case that he heard, during his electronic surveillance, the
plaintiffs wife acknowledge her prior adulteryOO with her paramour,
and agree to further assignations with him?
Suppose that on proper application an order was issued
permitting, within the ambit of the statute, a wiretap on the
telephone at "The Bucket of Blood," a bar and grill with a propensity
for trouble, and a reputation as the "front" for a gambling ring. The

85. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1O-407(c) (Supp. 1977).
86. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§ 802, 82 Stat. 217 (1968).
87. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 902(b), 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
88. It is to be observed that the legislative history to 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) (1976)
reveals that the amendment was designed "to permit evidence obtained through
the interception of wire or oral communications under court order to be employed
in civil actions." 1970 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4007, 4036.
89. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § lQ-407(c) (Supp. 1977).
90. A violation of MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 4 (1957).

1979]

Electronic Surveillance

203

wiretap conducted for thirty days discloses no violations of the
criminal laws of this state, but does indicate that the licensees of the
bar are violating one or more rules of the Board of Liquor License
Commissioners. The tapes of the intercepted communications are
sealed by order of the issuing judge and placed, pursuant to the same
order, in proper custody. The state's attorney, after reviewing a
transcript of the tapes, decides that there is simply nothing to
prosecute, and that he has been on a wild goose chase. Mter the
licensees, the targets of the interception order, are notified of the
interception pursuant to section 10-408(g)(4), they complain vigorously, but ignorantly, to the liquor board. Sensing it has found a way
to rid itself of a troublesome licensee, the board ascertains the name
of the officer who conducted the physical interception. The officer is
summonsed to appear and testify before the board and answer any
questions put to him, not concerning crimes, but about liquor board
rule violations. The proceeding before the board is civil in nature.
May the officer testify?
It is possible that if either of these two or other similar situations
reach the appellate courts they may decide that inasmuch as the
entire act is directed toward the detection, apprehension, and
conviction of violators of certain criminal laws, that implicit in the
term "any proceeding" as employed in section 10-407(c) is the word
"criminal." Such a ruling would narrow the existing broad language
of the section. Of course, the legislature has within its power the
authority to amend section 10-407(c) and thus possibly thwart
judicial interpretation.
Section 10-407(d) tracks the federal act, section 2517(4), with
respect to assuring that an otherwise privileged communication does
not "lose its privileged character" because it is .intercepted in
accordance with or in violation of the act. Stripped of legalese, the
sections provide that simply because a privileged conversation is
overheard, legally or illegally, the conversation does not lose its
privileged status and permit the party to whom the communication
was addressed to treat it as published and thus no longer privileged.
By way of illustration, if "C," client, telephones "A," his attorney,
and communicates to his attorney privileged matters, the fact that
"A" later ascertains that the conversation was intercepted by the
police who had lawfully or unlawfully tapped "C's" telephone does
not remove the privileged character of "C's" conversation with "A."
"A" must still treat the communication as privileged.

Section 10-408: Ex Parte Order Authorizing Interception
Unquestionably, section 10-408 and its federal cousin, section
2518, by virtue of their nature as "the meat" of the acts, have
received the greatest amount of judicial attention.
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The legislature has carefully set out a procedure that must be
followed by the attorney general or the state's attorney of the City of
Baltimore or of one of the twenty-three counties 91 in order to obtain a
valid order allowing interception of an oral or wire communication.
The application for an electronic or other device to intercept an oral
or wire communication must be in writing 92 and be made on oath or
affirmation to a judge of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City or of
the circuit court of the county wherein the order is to be executed.
The application must inform the issuing judge of the identity of the
law-enforcement officer who is making the application as well as
that of the officer who has authorized the application. It must set
forth a "full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances"93 upon which the applicant justifies his belief that an order
should be issued by the judge. The statement must be more than a
mere conclusory summary by the applicant. The statute necessitates
that it contain details of the offense that ''has been, is being, or is
about to be committed,"94 a description of the type and location from
which the interception will be made or the place where the
communication will be intercepted,95 "particular description of the
type of communications sought to be intercepted,"96 and the identity,
if known, of the person "committing the offense and whose
communications are to be intercepted."97
Although the Maryland appellate courts have not yet passed
upon the question of whether, under Maryland law, the person who
is identified in the application must playa central role in the crime
or suspected crime leading to the application, the Supreme Court has
said that there is no such requirement in the federal act. Identification does not impose a limitation on the use of intercept procedures. 98
91. See text accompanying notes 72-80 supra.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1976); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(a) (Supp.
1977). The Court of Special Appeals, in Shingleton v. State, 39 Md. App. 527,387
A.2d 1134 (1978), chided an issuing judge who orally authorized an interception
to be made on a public pay telephone, based on an oral application from a state
police officer. The Court took the occasion to exclaim:
We look with much disfavor upon the procedure used in the instant case,
both as to the application for the order and the authorization of the
interception. We note that had the application and order been made
subsequent to July 1, 1977, there would not be the slightest argumental
justification for the issuance of such an order because the Maryland law
[section 10-408] does not recognize the "emergency situation" exception
specified in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7).
39 Md. App. 527, 537, 387 A.2d 1134, 1140 (1978). Section 2518(7) permits oral
application under certain conditions and subject to strict post-order compliance
in cases of the national security and organized crime. No provision, for obvious
reasons, similar to section 2518(7) is incorporated in the Maryland statute.
93. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1O-408(a)(2) (Supp. 1977).
94. [d. § 10-408(a)(2)(i).
95. [d. § 10-408(a)(2)(ii).
96. [d. § 10-408(a)(2)(iii).
97. [d. § 10-408(a)(2)(iv).
98. United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977).
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Because the Maryland act follows so closely the federal statute, the
possibility is strong that if the courts of Maryland are confronted
with the issue, the result will be the same as that reached by the
Supreme Court.
Of critical importance in Maryland,99 but not regarded as
stringently by some of the United States Courts of Appeal is the
adherence to the statutorty mandate that the application for the
order demonstrate:
1) whether other investigative procedures have been tried and
failed; or
2) why they appear to the applicant to be not likely to succeed
if tried; or
3) why it is too dangerous to undertake them. 1°O
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Cacae,101 the Second Circuit
in United States v. Steinberg,102 the Third Circuit in United States v.
Armocida,103 and the First Circuit in In re Dunn,104 have all adopted
what is styled as a practical and common sense approach in
evaluating affidavits in support of applications for interception
orders. The seeds of that approach were planted in the legislative
history of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, which states:
Subparagraph (c) requires a full and complete statement
as to whether or not normal investigative procedures have
been tried and failed or why these are unlikely to succeed if
tried, or to be too dangerous. . . . The judgment would
involve a consideration of all the facts and circumstances.
Normal investigative procedure would include, for example,
standard visual or aural surveillance techniques by law
enforcement officers, general questioning or interrogation
under an immunity grant, use of regular search warrants,
and the infiltration of conspiratorial groups by undercover
agents or informants. Merely because a normal investigative
99. Judge Digges wrote for a unanimous court in State v. Siegel, 266 Md. at 274, 292
A.2d at 95, "The statute sets up a strict procedure that must be followed and we
will not abide any deviation, no matter how slight, from the prescribed path."
(emphasis in original). The Court of Special Appeals has thrice recently applied
the Siegel holding in Shingleton v. State, 39 Md. App. 527, 387 A.2d 1134 (1978);
Poore v. State, 39 Md. App. 44, 384 A.2d 103 (1978); and Calhoun v. State, 34 Md.
App. 365, 367 A.2d 40 (1977). See also Washburn v. State, 19 Md. App. 187,310
A.2d 176 (1973). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion
in United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1975).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1976); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(a)(3)
(Supp. 1977).
101. 529 F.2d 1167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 841 (1976).
102. 525 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
103. 515 F.2d 29 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975).
104. 507 F.2d 195 (1st Cir. 1974).
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technique is theoretically possible, it does not follow that it
is likely. What the provision envisions is that the showing
be tested in a practical and commonsense fashion. l05
The factual situation in Dunn is wanting in clarity. One may
glean from it, however, that the contents of the affidavit indicated
that the "target" of the investigation was suspicious of strangers.
Physical surveillance would be difficult at best because of its
possible detection and was, therefore, potentially dangerous to the
undercover agent. The nature of loan sharking deterred normal
investigative methods. The court held that there was sufficient
compliance with section 2518(1)(c), the federal relative of section
lo-408(a)(3), when the section was read in a "practical and
commonsense fashion."106
The Steinberg affidavit contained the following: "I allege the
facts contained in the numbered paragraphs to show that: ... (c)
Normal investigative procedures reasonably appear unlikely to
succeed, or are too dangerous to be used . . . ."107 The application
described the progress made in the agent's investigation, deliveries
of drugs, representations of the suspect, the lack of undercover
access to the suspect, as well as the unlikelihood of gaining access to
the suspect, and the affiant's experience and knowledge. The
Steinberg court held that the affidavit substantially complied with
section 2518(1)(c) and (3)(C).108
In A-rmocida the court found substantial compliance based on a
factual predicate within the confines of the affidavit which the court
noted included: (1) a history of a physical surveillance; (2) use of
informants; and (3) undercover agents, as well as (4) other wiretap
interceptions. None of those techniques was successful. The affidavit
also indicated that (1) the informant would not testify; (2) physical
surveillance was too easily detected and could jeopardize further
investig·ation; and (3) a search warrant would, in all probability, not
reveal the identities of those involved in the conspiracy or of the
source of heroin.l09
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Giordano,llo said:
[1968] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 2190 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
507 F.2d at 197.
525 F.2d at 1130 n.3.
Id. at 1130.
515 F.2d at 38. Other cases adhering to the "substantial compliance"
requirements, because of the "practical and commonsense" philosophy include
United States V. Anderson, 542 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Matya,
541 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977); United States v.
Robertson, 504 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975); United
States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974);
United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909
(1975); United States V. Fina, 405 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Pa. 1975); State v. Rowman,
116 N.H. 41, 352 A.2d 737 (1976).
110. 416 U.S. 505 (1974).

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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Congress legislated in considerable detail in providing for
applications and orders authorizing wiretapping and
evinced the clear intent to make doubly sure that the
statutory authority be used with restraint and only where
the circumstances warrant the surreptitious interception of
wire and oral communications. These procedures were not to
be routinely employed as the initial step in criminal
investigation. Rather, the applicant must state and the court
must find that normal investigative procedures have been
tried and failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to
succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. l l l
The Court of Special Appeals, in Calhoun v. State, stated that,
[c]ourts are not free to infer from the mere presentation
of an application or petition, supported by an affidavit, that
normal investigative procedure will not work. There must be
specific compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 2518. The affidavit
must demonstrate to the issuing judge that normal
investigative measures have been tried and failed, or they
are unlikely to be successful under the circumstances, or that
their use is too perilous to the investigators. That a prior
affidavit for another time and another place so demonstrates, even when incorporated by reference, is not
compliance with the strict requirements of the Act. ll2
The conclusion is easily reached that irrespective of the
"substantial compliance" view held by some courts, Maryland
insists upon strict compliance, and will, in the words of Judge
Digges in Siegel, "not abide any deviation, no matter how slight,
from the prescribed path,"1l3 for pre-intercept application requirements.
Section 10-408(a)(4) directs that the application contain a
"statement of the period of time for which the interception is
required to be maintained." If the investigation is of such a nature
that it "should not automatically terminate" when the type of
communication sought is first obtained, a particular description of
"facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional
communications of the same type will occur thereafter"1l4 is also
required.
.
Section 10-408(a)(5) commands the revelation to the issuing
judge of any and all previous applications for interceptions known to
the applicant that concern the person or persons whose

111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 515 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
34 Md. App. at 376-77, 367 A.2d at 46 (emphasis in original).
266 Md. at 274, 292 A.2d at 95.
MD. CTS. & JUD. !>Roc. CODE ANN. § 1(}-408(a)(4) (Supp. 1977).
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communications are proposed to be intercepted, the place or places
where those interceptions occurred or are proposed to occur, and "the
action taken by the judge on each application." The latter
requirement appears to be surplusage unless it refers to the sealing
of tapes and the placing of them in custody under the direction of the
judge. Otherwise the interception clearly demonstrates what action
the judge took. On the other hand, disclosure of a denied request
indicates the judge refused to grant an order.
Section 10-408(a)(6) provides for an extension of the interception
order initially granted. The application for the extension must
include the results obtained as of that time and why the intercept
has failed.
Sections 10-408(a)(4),(5) and (6) must be read together with
section 1o-408(e). The latter section prescribes the time limits in
which the order or any extension of it has vitality. It contains
language strikingly similar to that of 18 United States Code section
2518(5) from which it has been cloned and limits interception orders
to the minimum necessary to obtain the objective. The order's
duration may not exceed thirty days. It may be extended, however,
for an additional period of "no longer than the authorizing judge
deems necessary to achieve the purposes for which it was granted
and in no event for longer than 30 days." These statutorily
sanctioned "extensions" make it crystalline that neither the
Attorney General nor the "principal attorney" of a political
subdivision is restricted as to the number of extensions that may be
authorized. ll5
One of the weaknesses of the state's case in Siegel was its utter
failure to comply with section 2518(5) of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968. By that section the Congress mandated
that any intercept order be for no "longer than is necessary to
achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event longer
than thirty days." The first Siegel order was for five days, a period
well within the statutory time, except that it made no effort to limit
the interception to a shorter period, if the objective was achieved in
less time. The Court of Appeals held that the failure to require
termination of the interception upon attaining the objective within
five days "left too much discretion in the hands of the state
police."ll6 Furthermore, Siegel noted that the two renewal orders,
permitted by section 2518(5) were void because the original order
upon which the latter two were grounded lacked the statement of
limitation to the attainment of the objective if it was achieved prior
to the outer time limit specified in the order.ll7 Section 1O-408(e)
provides, in effect, the same limitations imposed by the Congress in
U5. ld. § 1D-408(e) (Supp. 1977).
U6. 266 Md. at 273, 292 A.2d at 95.
U7.ld.
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section 2518(5), and the construction placed upon section 2518(5) by
Siegel will undoubtedly be transferred to any issue arising in the
appellate courts of Maryland out of section 10-408(e).
Before a judge may issue an order authorizing electronic or other
type of interception of oral or wire communications, he or she must
be satisfied that the facts submitted by the applicant establish
probable cause for the belief that the person or persons whose
communications are sought to be intercepted have committed or are
about to commit one of the offenses enumerated in section 10-406.11 8
The facts must indicate to the judge that there is probable cause to
believe that "particular communications" relative to the offense will
be obtained through interception. ll9 Additionally, the application
must demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe that "the
facilities from which, or the place where" the interception is to be
made are leased to, listed in the name or names of, or commonly
used by the person whose communication is to be intercepted. 120
The application, as has been previously noted, must also contain
the statement relative to why normal investigative procedures will
not work or have not worked, or are too dangerous. 121 An application
for an extension of an order was held to be defective in Calhoun
because the application for the extension did not allege that normal
investigative methods had been tried or would not succeed if tried,
nor that they were too dangerous to the police. The investigating
officers in Calhoun endeavored to "piggy-back" the defective
affidavit onto the prior valid affidavit under an incorporation by
reference theory. The tap uncovered an illegal gambling operation
taking place in a residential neighborhood. Based on this information a search and seizure warrant was executed and gambling
paraphernalia was impounded. The court struck down the intercept
order for the private phone and directed suppression of the evidence
derived from the illegal tap.122
The Maryland statute also requires that each order allowing
interception of an oral or wire communication shall specify the name
of the person, if known to the applicant, whose communications are
to be intercepted; the nature and place of the interception; the type of
communication to be intercepted and the offense to which it relates;
the agency that will conduct the interception and the name of the
person authorizing the application. 123
Subsection (d)(l)(v) of section 10-408 provides that the order
shall also contain "[t]he period of time during which the interception
118. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § lo-408(c)(I) (Supp. 1977).
119. Id. § lo-408(c)(2). The law does not sanction mere "fishing expeditions" or
intrusion into private communications on bare "hunches."
120. Id. § lo-408(c)(4).
121. Id. § lo-408(c)(3).
122. Calhoun v. State, 34 Md. App. 565, 367 A.2d 40 (1977).
123. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.§ lo-408(d)(I)(i)(ii)(iii)(iv) (Supp. 1977).
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is authorized, including a statement as to whether the interception
shall automatically terminate when the described communication
has been first obtained." At a first reading, this subsection appears
to conflict with the federal statute, section 2518(5), which, as we have
seen, requires an interception to cease when it has achieved its
objective, but actually there is no clash between the two. The fact is
that subsection (d)(l)(v) is lifted from section 2518(4)(e) verbatim.
Subsection (d)(l)(v) of section 10-408 must be read together with
subsection (e). When that is done, it becomes clear that what is
meant is that orders for interception shall contain a provision that
when the objective is obtained, the interception shall cease, but there
are exceptions to that rule. If the police can satisfy the issuing judge,
and ultimately an appellate court, if it is called upon to review the
order, that the nature of the investigation necessitates that the
"interception should not automatically terminate" when the police
first obtain the particular information sought, because there is
probable cause to believe that "additional communications of the
same type will occur thereafter,"124 the issuing judge may permit the
interception to continue past the first achievement of the objective.
This order is not operative for more than thirty days in any event. 125
Upon request of the applicant, the issuing judge "shall direct
that a communications common carrier, landlord, custodian or other
person furnish" such facilities and technical assistance as may be
required in order to carry out the interception with a minimum of
interference and the maximum confidentiality as circumstances
allow. 126 Landlords, custodians, and communication common
carriers or other persons rendering assistance are to be compensated
for the use of their facilities or aid to the state "at the prevailing
rates." 127
The statute mandates that progress reports be submitted to the
issuing judge while the interception order is in effect. In fact, the
order authorizing the interception shall contain a provision
requiring reports to be made to the judge with such frequency as he
or she directs. 128
Last, but by no means least, is the state and federal requirement
that interceptions are to minimize eavesdropping of communications
"not otherwise subject to interception."129 This restriction is
designed to protect the privacy of non-relevant communications as
124. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(d) (1976); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(a)(4)
(Supp. 1977).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE. ANN. § 1O-408(e) (Supp.
1977).
126. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(d)(2) (Supp. 1977).
127. Id. By whom and how the "prevailing rates" are to be determined is not disclosed
by the act.
128. Id. § 10-408(f).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(e) (Supp.
1977).
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well as those privileged under law. The Poore court pointed out the
practical difficulty with minimization orders. The court, in response
to an attack on the overhearing and recording of a conversation
between one of the targets of the interception and her attorney, said:
If the police were required to cease all listening,
recording, and spot-checking because the conversation
appeared superficially to be a privileged communication, it
would not be long before those involved in unlawful activity
would circumvent the wiretap by creating the impression to
the monitor that the conversation was a privileged
communication irrespective of its content. The titles of
"attorney," "doctor," "reverend," "priest," or "father" might
well become underworld code words in order to defeat
electronic interception. 130

Shortly after Poore was decided, the Supreme Court, in Scott v.
United States,13l a seven-to-two decision,132 stated that:
[b]ecause of the necessarily ad hoc nature of any determination of reasonableness, there can be no inflexible rule of law

130. 39 Md. App. at 71, 384 A.2d at 119.
131. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
132. The author of the opinion, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, was joined by the Chief Justice
and Mr. Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens. Mr. Justice
Brennan dissented and Mr. Justice Marshall joined therein. In his critical
dissent of the majority decision, Mr. Justice Brennan wrote as follows:
In a linguistic tour de force the Court converts the mandatory language
that the interception "shall be conducted" to a precatory suggestion. Nor
can the Court justify its disregard of the statute's language by any
demonstration that it is necessary to do so to effectuate Congress'
purpose as expressed in the legislative history. On the contrary, had the
Court been faithful to the congressional purpose, it would have
discovered in § 2518(10)(a) and its legislative history the unambiguous
congressional purpose to have enforced the several limitations on
interception imposed by the statute. Section 2518(1O)(a) requires
suppression of evidence intercepted in violation of the statute's
limitations on interception and the legislative history emphasizes
Congress' intent that the exclusionary remedy serve as a deterrent
against the violation of those limitations by law enforcement personnel.
See S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 96 (1968).
The Court's attempted obfuscation in Part II, ante, 6-10, of its total
disregard of the statutory mandate is a transparent failure. None of the
cases discussed there deciding the reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment of searches and seizures deals with the discrete problems of
wire interceptions or addresses the construction of the minimization
requirement of § 2518(5). Congress provided the answer to that problem
and the wording of its command and not general Fourth Amendment
principles must be the guide to our decision. The Court offers no
explanation for its failure to heed the aphorism: "Though we may not
end with the words in construing a disputed statute, one certainly begins
there." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
Colum. L. Rev. 527, 535 (1947).
Id. at 145-47 (footnotes omitted).
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which will decide every case. The statute does not forbid the
interception of all nonrelevant conversations, but rather
instructs the agents to conduct the surveillance in such a
manner as to "minimize" the interception of such conversatiOlis. Whether the agents have in fact conducted the wiretap
in such a manner will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that blind reliance
on the percentage of nonpertinent calls intercepted is not a
sure guide to the correct answer. Such percentages may
provide assistance, but there are surely cases, such as the
one at bar, where the percentage of nonpertinent calls is
relatively high and yet their interception was still reasonable. The reasons for this may be many. Many of the
nonpertinent calls may have been very short. Others may
have been one-time only calls. Still other calls may have
been ambiguous in nature or involve guarded or coded
language. In all these circumstances agents can hardly be
expected to know that the calls are not pertinent prior to
their termination.
In determining whether the agents properly minimized
it is also important to consider the circumstances of the
wiretap. For example, when the investigation is focusing on
what is thought to be a widespread conspiracy more
extensive surveillance may be justified in an attempt to
determine the precise scope of the enterprise. And it is
possible that many more of the conversations will be
permissibly interceptable because they will involve one or
more of the co-conspirators. The type of use to which the
telephone is normally put may also have some bearing on
the extent of minimization required. For example, if the
agents are permitted to tap a public telephone because one
individual is thought to be placing bets over the phone,
substantial doubts as to minimization may arise if the
agents listen to every call which goes out over the phone
regardless of who places the call. On the other hand, if the
phone is located in the residence of a person who is thought
to be the head of a major drug ring, a contrary conclusion
may be indicated.
. . . In a case . . . involving a wide-ranging conspiracy
with a large number of participants even a seasoned listener
would have been hard pressed to determine with any
precision the relevancy of many of the calls before they were
completed. A large number were ambiguous in nature,
making characterization virtually impossible until the
completion of these calls. And some of the nonpertinent
conversations were one-time conversations. Since these calls
did not give the agents an opportunity to develop a category
of innocent calls which should not have been intercepted,
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their interception cannot be viewed as a violation of the
minimization requirement. 133
Minimization, it would appear, is not the bogeyman police and
prosecutors portray it to be, nor is it a panacea for defense counsel
claiming every intercept to be an abuse of legislative intent. To quote
Mr. Justice Rehnquist in Scott, each case must be determined "on
the facts and circumstances" peculiar to it. 134
After the interception has occurred and the communication,
when possible, recorded "on tape or wire," custody of the tape or wire
is in such place as the issuing judge shall order. The recordings may
not be destroyed for at least ten years. Although the code provides
for duplicates of recordings for use during investigations, the
presence of the judge's seal on the originals, or its absence
satisfactorily explained, is a prerequisite to admission of the
recordings' contents into evidence. The same requirement applies to
physical evidence or testimony derived from the intercepted
communication attempted to be placed into evidence. 135
Of singular importance in both the federal and state statutes is
the inventory notice. This requirement commands the issuing judge
to serve an inventory notice on the person or persons whose
communications have been intercepted. Such notice must disclose to
that person, or persons, that an order authorizing the interception
was in fact granted, the date of the order, and the period of time
during which the interception was authorized, along with a
statement as to whether wire or oral communications were actually
intercepted. In addition to the person or persons whose
communications were sought to be intercepted, the issuing judge
may notify any other party whose oral or wire communications were
intercepted as a result of the order, if the judge deems that
notification is in the interest of justice. 136
Unlike the federal act, the state statute makes no provision for
notification to a person whose interception of oral or wire
communications was sought but denied. Title 18 United States Code,
section 2518(8)(d) provides in pertinent part that,
[w]ithin a reasonable time but not later than ninety days
after the filing of an application for an order of approval
under section 2518(7)(b) which is denied or the termination
of an order or extensions . . . the issuing or denying judge
shall cause [notice] to be served. 137
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 139-40, 142 (citation omitted).
Id. at 140.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1O-408(g)(1) (Supp. 1977).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (1976); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC CODE ANN. § 1G-408(g)(4)
(Supp. 1977).
137. (Emphasis added). The federal act was utilized in Poore where the order
postponing the service of an inventory was lost by the assistant state's attorney.
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Congress's purpose in reqUlrmg service of an inventory
including notice of the order's denial was to prevent the government
from establishing or attempting to establish electronic surveillance
on a person without that person ever learning about it. 138 Whether
the Maryland statute, with respect to notification, will be construed
as less restrictive than the federal law remains to be seen. The safer
course is for the legislature to conform section lo-408(g)(4) to section
2518(8)(d), thereby eliminating all doubt. Pending action by the
General Assembly or an appellate decision upholding the state's
version of non-notification, the better practice is for the judge to
whom the application is made and by whom it is denied to follow the
strictures of 18 United States Code, section 2518(8)(d).
Extensions of time for service of the inventory required by
section 2518(8)(d) is not provided for in the Maryland law. Therefore,
the issuing judge must order service of inventory on the individual
whose communications were intercepted, such service to be made
within ninety days of the termination of the original intercept order
or its extension. Counsel for the "target" of the interception or other
persons who receive an inventory may file a motion to inspect
portions of the intercepted communications. l3g
The Maryland Code makes unmistakable that neither the
contents of an intercepted communication nor the evidence derived
therefrom is admissible in any proceeding in Maryland, unless each
party has been furnished with a copy of the order and the
application for the order, within not less than ten days before the
proceeding. 140 In those cases where interception has been made
without an order,l4l the parties shall be notified, not less than ten
days before trial, hearing or other proceeding, of the interception and
the reason why an order was not required. l42
Notwithstanding the unambiguous language of Siegel that the
court will not abide the slightest deviation from strict compliance
with the federal wiretap code, the court, in Spease, held that a
notification of inventory, while not precisely following the act, did
provide "actual notice of the wiretap ... almost six months prior to
trial, [and thus] Spease ... [and Ross, Spease's codefendant] did not
suffer any prejudice."l43 Patently, Spease announced a "substantial

138.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Because post order compliance is not as stringent as pre-order and operative
order compliance, no harm resulted to the appellants. Unlike his brother the
federal judge, pursuant to section 2518(8)(d), the Maryland jurist possesses no
authority under section 1O-408(g)(4) to extend the service of the inventory
beyond ninety days.
In re United States Authorizing Interception of Wire Communications, 413 F.
Supp. 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Washburn v. State, 19 Md. App. 187, 198-201, 310 A.2d 176, 183-84 (1973).
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(h) (Supp. 1977).
Id. § 1o-402(c).
Id. § lo-408(h).
275 Md. at 109, 338 A.2d at 296.
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compliance" standard while simultaneously declaring in a footnote,
"[n]othing in our opinion in this case is intended to depart in any
way from our holding in Siegel. "144 It was left to the Court of Special
Appeals in Poore to explain what appeared to be a conflict between
Spease and Siegel. That court observed that,
[a] careful reading of both cases makes it transpicuous that
Siegel is directed to pre-intercept and intercept conditions.
As to those two (2) happenings, not the slightest deviation
from the statute will be sanctioned. On the other hand,
Spease indicates that when post-intercept events are brought
into question, the Court looks to the facts so as to ascertain
whether there has been substantial compliance with the
post-intercept provisions of the act and whether there has
been actual prejudice to the defendant. Thus, it is obvious
that there is a distinction between pre-order and post-order
compliance. In the former, a defect will void the order and
cause suppression of the evidence,145 but in the latter, a
defect will not vitiate the order if there has been substantial
compliance and no prejudice to the defendant is shown. 146
The contents of a communication will be suppressed as will any
evidence derived therefrom on application from an aggrieved party if
the communication was unlawfully intercepted, the order permitting
interception is invalid, or the interception was not made in
accordance with the order.147
The state possesses the right of appeal from the denial of an
application for an order,148 It appears that such an appeal will take
the nature of an ex parte proceeding because the party whose
communications are to be intercepted, under Maryland State law, is
not notified if the application is denied,149 and if the federal act
applies, notification need not be made for ninety days following the
denial,150 Theoretically, the appeal can be prosecuted and determined
before the expiration of the ninety days. But what if it is not, and the
fact that the interception order was denied is served upon the

144. Id. at 108 n.3, 338 A.2d at 295 n.3.
145. In Shingleton v. State, 39 Md. App. 527, 387 A.2d 1134 (1978), an oral order, an
absolute nullity, to intercept a wire communication was authorized. Not only was
the order invalid but the "application" was made by a state police officer over a
telephone. The state police officer was not, of course, the principal prosecuting
attorney for the state or of any political subdivision thereof, and completely
lacked authority to apply for the order. While the order was held to be void, there
was, it developed, nothing to suppress because there was not a recording of any
communication that may have been intercepted, if any.
146. 39 Md. App. at 53-54, 384 A.2d at 110 (emphasis in original).
147. MD. CTS. & JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 1Q-408(i)(1) (Supp. 1977).
148. Id. § 1Q-408(i)(3).
149. Id. § 1Q-408(g).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976).
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individual whose oral or wire communications are sought to be
intercepted? May he or she intervene in the appeal so as to oppose
the state's action? Would the notification of the application for an
order render the issue moot for practical purposes because the
surreptitious nature of the interception is irretrievably lost?
Section 10-408(i)(1) provides that an "aggrieved person" may
"in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court ... of
this State ... move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire
or oral communication . . . ." That language is not sufficient to
embrace the case of an individual endeavoring to uphold a court's
refusal to issue an intercept order because the section is confined to
an "aggrieved person" whose communication has been intercepted.
The expectation of an interception is not the equivalent of an actual
interception.

Section 10-409: Reports to Administrative Office of the Courts and
to the General Assembly
To assure that intercept orders are not arbitrarily issued or
denied, the judge must file a detailed report with the administrative
office of the courts within thirty days of the decision. The report
should incorporate all pertinent information except the identity of
the person whose oral or wire communication was ordered to be
intercepted or whose interception was denied. 151 The attorney
general and state's attorneys are directed to file annual detailed
reports relative to interception orders to the administrative office of
the courtS. 152 The state court administrator, in turn, must advise the
General Assembly by "a full and complete report" as to the number
of applications "granted or denied," and he is authorized to issue
"binding regulations" dealing with the content and form of the
reports required to be filed by the issuing judge, attorney general and
state's attorneys.153 By requiring the annual report, the legislature
may keep check on the wiretap eavesdrop law to assure that it is not
being abused.
.

Section 10-410: Civil Liability, Defense to Civil or Criminal Action
Any interception or disclosure in violation of the State electronic
surveillance and eavesdrop law entitles the person whose privacy
has been violated to maintain a civil action for "[a]ctual damages
but not less than liquidated damages ... of $100 a day for each
day" or a total of "$1,000, whichever is higher," plus punitive
damages where actual damages are found, reasonable attorney's

151. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. ANN. § 1O-409(a) (Supp. 1977).
152. [d. § 1O-409(b).
153. [d. § lo-409(c).
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fees, and costs. 154 A good faith reliance on an order of court or
legislative authorization is a complete defense to any civil or
criminal action brought under section 10-410 "or under any other
law."155

Section 10-411: Registration
Number

of Intercepting

Devices;

Serial

Penultimately, the act necessitates a registration with the
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services of "all
electronic, mechanical or other devices" which are designed to be
used primarily for the "surreptitious interception of wire and oral
communications . . . ."156 Each device so registered shall be issued a
serial number which is affixed to the device. 157

Section 10-412: Breaking and Entering, etc., to Place or Remove
Equipment
Ultimately, the General Assembly has condemned and made a
felony punishable by imprisonment "for not more than ten years"
any breaking or entering, or entering under false pretenses, or
trespass without a court order upon any premises with the intent to
place, adjust, or remove wiretapping or electronic surveillance
equipment. 158 This section does not seem to have exempted police
officers from its scope nor to have permitted judges to issue an order
contrary thereto. Additionally, Maryland has no statute conferring
upon the Attorney General or State's Attorneys the blanket
authority to grant immunity to one person in exchange for his
testimony against another, although there are limited statutory
provisions allowing the grant of immunity of certain specific
offenses. 159
Title 18 United States Code sections 6002 and 6003 confer the
authority to grant immunity from prosecution on a United States
Attorney when in his judgment, with the approval of the Attorney
General, he deems it advisable to so do to protect the public interest
or to induce testimony or other information when the witness is
likely to invoke the fifth amendment "privilege against self-

154. Id. § 1D-41O(a). There is no monetary limitation upon the recovery of punitive or
exemplary damages other than that such an award be warranted under the
circumstances of the case. See D. C. Transit System, Inc. v. Brooks, 264 Md. 578,
287 A.2d 251 (1972); Vancherie v. Siperly, 243 Md. 366, 221 A.2d 356 (1966);
Galusca v. Dodd, 189 Md. 666, 57 A.2d 313 (1948); Dennis v. Baltimore Transit
Co., 189 Md. 610, 56 A.2d 813 (1948).
155. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1D-410(b) (Supp. 1977).
156. Id. § 1D-411(a).
157. Id. § 1D-411(c).
158. Id. § 1D-412.
159. Bowie v. State, 14 Md. App. 567, 287 A.2d 782 (1972).
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incrimination."l60 As with most immunity statutes, the witness is
not exempt under section 6002 from prosecution for perjury or
contempt.
It is to be observed that if, upon application to the court, the
witness is ordered to testify or produce evidence which may
incriminate him, and he does so after refusing "on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination," the compelled testimony or
evidence shall not be used against him in a criminal case. 161
Inferentially, the triggering mechanism that brings about immunity
must be pulled by the witness's claiming his fifth amendment right
not to incriminate himself. It would appear that if he refuses to
testify without invoking the fifth amendment but is ordered by a
court to so do under penalty of contempt, he might be successfully
prosecuted in the same or another proceeding. As a practical matter,
the problem may never arise because of the necessity to insure the
witness's cooperation, his willingness to avoid prosecution, and the
knowledge by the judge and United States Attorney that such
testimony under threat of punishment for contempt would, in and of
itself, be a violation of the witness's constitutional protections.
IV. PEN REGISTERS
The Supreme Court, in United States v. New York Telephone
Company,162 held in a plurality opinion that "pen registers"163 do
not fall within the definition of "intercept" as that word is employed
in 18 United States Code sections 2510-2520. Mr. Justice White, in
New York Telephone, wrote that "Congress defined 'intercept' to
mean 'the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or
other device.' 18 United States Code section 2510(4)."164 The
rationale of the decision is that pen registers do not overhear nor
disclose the content of a wire or oral communication but merely
reveal that one telephone was used to dial the number of another. In
short, the pen register records only that a communication was made
or attempted.
Of material aid to Justice White was the legislative history of
section 2510(4) wherein it is stated that,
160.
161.
162.
163.

18 U.S.C. §6003 (1976).
Id. § 6002 (emphasis added).
434 U.S. 159 (1977).
Mr. Justice Powell, in United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n.l (1974),
said:
[a] pen register is a mechanical device attached to a given telephone
line and usually installed at a central telephone facility. It records on a
paper tape all numbers dialed from that line. It does not identify the
telephone numbers from which incoming calls originated, nor does it
reveal whether any call, either incoming or outgoing, was completed. Its
use does not involve any monitoring of telephone conversations.
164. 434 U.S. at 166 (emphasis in original).

1979]

Electronic Surveillance

219

[t]he proposed legislation is not designed to prevent the
tracing of phone calls. The use of a "pen register," for
example, would be permissible. . . . The proposed legislation
is intended to protect the privacy of the communication itself
and not the means of communication. 165
The Court did not reach the question of whether the use of a
"pen register" was a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. Instead it confined its discussion to the sphere of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 166
At the time New York Telephone was decided, there was pending
before the Court of Appeals of Maryland Smith v. State,167 a "pen
register" case in which the use of the register was challenged not
only as violative of Maryland statutory provisions, but also of the
fourth amendment because of the failure of the police to obtain a
search and seizure warrant permitting the utilization of the register.
In an opinion authored by Chief Judge Murphy for a sharply divided
court,168 the majority, paralleling the New York Telephone decision,
held that the use of the pen register did not violate the then
Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code Annotated section
10-402 because it was not an interception of a communication.
Unlike the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals did consider
and rule upon whether, under the fourth amendment, a court order
was needed in order to attach the pen register. Chief Judge Murphy
observed that "the expectation of privacy protected by the fourth
amendment attaches to the content of a telephone conversation and
not to the fact that a conversation took place."169 The majority of the
court declared:
We hold that there is no constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed in a
telephone system and hence no search within the fourth
amendment is implicated by the use of a pen register
installed at the central offices of the telephone company.
While the guarantees of the fourth amendment are broad,
they are not boundless, State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d
86 (1972); not everything a person may want to be private is
protected by the fourth amendment. . . . The intrusion
165. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 90, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 2112, 2178.
166. That the Supreme Court did not reach the search and seizure issue is explained
by Mr. Justice White: "The [United States] Court of Appeals held that pen
register surveillance was subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
This conclusion is not challenged by either party, and we find it unn.ecessary to
consider the matter." 434 U.S. at 165 n.7.
Md. _ , 389 A.2d 858 (1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 609 (1978).
167. _
168. The Court split four to three. Judge Eldridge wrote a dissent in which Judge
Digges joined. Judge Cole penned a separate dissent.
169. _
Md. at _ , 389 A.2d at 864.
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involved in pen register surveillance is minimal; no violation
of the integrity of the communication system itself is
entailed; and no conversation is overheard.l7°
Judge Eldridge, writing for himself and Judge Digges, saw no
distinction between the pen register's recording of numbers dialed
and the action of police in conducting a warrantless search. He
pointed out that except for a relatively minor number of long
distance calls,. the telephone company keeps no record of numbers
dialed from a particular phone. He asked how the majority could
conclude that because of the recordation by the telephone company
of long distance calls, a telephone user did not expect privacy in the
dialing of local calls.l7l Furthermore, the dissenters expressed their
dismay that the majority would distinguish between verbal and
digital transmission. Communication is protected under Katz v.
United States,172 they concluded, whatever its form. He and Judge
Digges, as well as Judge Cole, believed that the use of the pen
register requires the obtaining of a judicially passed order based on
probable cause, before the police may install a pen register.
The obtention vel non of a search warrant before the installation
of a pen register is allowed is largely contingent upon the viewer's
philosophical outlook on the fourth amendment. Those who believe
that the dialer of a telephone has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the number called because of its going through the
telephone company's intricate communications system will rally to
the side of the majority. On the other hand, those who think that the
dialer of a telephone call is entitled to the protection of the fourth
amendment in using the telephone argue that under Smith, the
police are now licensed to install pen registers at will on anyone's
phone for whatever purpose, without any cause, much less "probable
cause" being first demonstrated to a judicial officer.
The final outcome will have to await a definitive decision of the
Supreme Court. Until then, however, it is clear that in Maryland the
police no longer need judicial authorization for the installation of a
pen register on any telephone, private or public.
V. CONCLUSION
The General Assembly of Maryland, demonstrating its displeasure generally with eavesdropping and wiretaps, has tracked the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 United
States Code sections 2510-2520, in enacting sections 10-401 through
10-412. In so doing, the legislature has narrowed the ambit of the
170. Id. at _ , 389· A.2d at 867-68.
171. Id. at _,389 A.2d at 868-69 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
172. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (communication deserving of fourth amendment protection,
provided reasonable expectation of privacy exists).
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act, with the addition of arson, by Act of May 2, 1978, chapter 339,
1978 Maryland Laws 1424, to eight specific crimes and conspiracy to
commit any of those eight. Observing the signal flag flown in Siegel
that the state may adopt a more restrictive act than that of the
federal government, the General Assembly has circumscribed the
Maryland wire and oral communications interception law well
within the confines of that passed by Congress.
The state statute, however, may not mean what it seems to say
relative to testimony and evidence derived from wiretaps or other
interceptions of oral or wire communications being admissible in
any proceeding.
Prior decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Court of
Special Appeals, interpreting sections of the federal law that appear
in the new state act in verbatim form or in a form substantially like
that adopted by the Congress, make indubitable that most of the
state law will certainly withstand constitutional attack. The failure
of the state law to require the service of notice on an individual
whose oral and wire communications are sought to be intercepted by
the state, but denied by the judge, casts doubt upon that particular
section in light of the federal act's more restrictive provisions, but
the legislature may remove any doubt by way of amendment. The
act as written guarantees to the people of Maryland, insofar as the
state, itself, is concerned, greater protection from surreptitious
eavesdropping and wiretapping than that afforded the people by the
Congress.
How often we do complain,
That our spoken words go unheard,
That no one really cares what we maintain,
Our utterances are thought absurd.
Cheer up! There is one to hear,
An electronic recorder is in gear,
And now we live in fear,
For what we earlier did state
May be recorded on government tape.

